Historically, juror communications outside of the court and
access to information regarding the case in which they are impaneled has been
strictly limited. In efforts to
safeguard the fairness of a trial – and thus sequester those truly deciding its
verdict from any and all outside influence and information deemed unsuitable –
juror instructions regarding suitable activity during court service have
included aspects regarding the prohibition of outside research and
communications regarding the case.
Nevertheless, such guidelines have proven inefficient as technology and
social media use has drastically evolved, becoming an important aspect of everyday
life and proving almost impossible to restrict.
Since the advent of new mass communication technologies such as Twitter,
Facebook, and LinkedIn, coupled with technological advances which have
increased their accessibility beyond those just within the home, countless trials
and verdicts have resulted in mistrials and retrials due to juror misuse of
such technologies in order to conduct outside research and communicate with
others – including other members of the jury, which is strongly prohibited outside
of court and before deliberations and reaching a verdict. Examples of such cases include Clark v. State, in which a Maryland
resident convicted of first degree murder won a mistrial in appeal after it had
been discovered that a juror impaneled in his trial had researched aspects of
his case on Wikipedia and brought the printouts to court, thus potentially “tainting”
the rest of the jury. Another includes
the reversal of a Kentucky first degree murder conviction due to two jurors’
Facebook friendship with the mother of the victim during the trial. It is nothing if not incredibly troubling
that such mundane use of social media has the potentiality to reverse court
decisions and lead to mistrials in cases involving crimes as hugely serious as
first degree murder.
So what can be done to limit such mistrials? New juror guidelines created by the Judicial
Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management as well as individual states have suggested altered juror instructions which
include special references to a wide variety of prohibited social media
use. However, is that enough? Should we, as some suggest, sequester juries
in controlled settings throughout the entirety of their duty? Or would the financial burden of doing so
represent a cost too great to incur upon the taxpayers in order to ensure a
fair trial? Is it enough to rely on jury
instructions and individual juror accountability to curb the use of social
media communications and outside research, or are stricter regulations of juror
actions required to limit the possibility of mistrial and reversal of costly,
time-consuming verdicts? Such inquiries
will surely only increase in prevalence and importance as both technology and
social media use continue to expand and develop within our society.